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TODD M. LOPEZ*

A Look at Climate Change and the
Evolution of the Kyoto Protocol
The withdrawal of the United States from climate change
negotiations and the Kyoto Protocol ratification almost singlehandedly defeated the only concerted international attempt to
curb worldwide carbon dioxide emissions. Climate change
discussions entered the internationalarena in 1988, and by 1997
the Kyoto Protocol was drafted and ready for signing and
ratification.It will not enter into force until it has been ratified by
at least 55 states that account for 55 percent of, the total
industrialized carbon dioxide emissions of 1990. During the
course of negotiations, U.S. participantshave effectively worked
to minimize commitments and increase alternatives to
straightforwardreductions. Although no longer a signatory, and
with no intentions to ratify, the United States has forced the
parties to the Protocol to accept weaker targets and greater
compromises. Even if climate change proves not to be the threat
that some scientists claim it will be, an entire internationallegal,
political, and economic structure is now being created that will
substantially affect the global economic environment. Isolating
itselffrom the rest of the world, the United States will surely face
the consequences of non-involvement in the years to come.
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the Earth's history, average temperatures
have fluctuated slightly by one or two degrees centigrade over any given
span of time. These slight variations are evident in the geologic record
and are responsible for events such as ice ages. The understanding that
such small changes in the climate can have incredibly devastating effects
on the Earth's ecosystems and the species inhabiting them has led to
increasing concern about the recent global warming phenomenon. The
last decade has been the warmest in the last 1000 years and scientists
have predicted that temperatures will continue to increase for several
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decades to come.1 The average temperature has already increased by
approximately one degree Centigrade in the last 100 years2 and is
expected to rise anywhere from two to eleven degrees over the next
century.3 The strong scientific consensus is that this is due largely, if not
entirely, to humanity's ever-increasing consumption of and dependence
on non-renewable fossil fuels.
International negotiations began in 1988 to address climate
change. Most of the discussions were aimed at curbing the amount of
carbon dioxide (CO2) that is produced by industrialized countries. Due to
their heavy dependence on fossil fuels and the industries that support
them, the United States was wary of entering into any binding
agreements. The United States is responsible for emitting over 30 percent
of the industrialized emissions of CO 2 and any requirements to reduce
these emissions would have a significant effect on business and the
American economy in general.4 The lack of commitment by the United
States to any binding targets has effectively diluted climate change
negotiations and has forced the Parties to the Protocol (Parties) to accept
a weak and potentially impotent document.
Environmental Background
During the last few decades, the topic of global warming has
inspired heated debates among world leaders, industry representatives,
and environmentalists. Although there is a strong consensus in the
scientific community that human contribution of significant
concentrations of greenhouse gasses to the environment has created a
greenhouse effect, much remains unknown about the long-term
consequences of human activity on the climate.
Greenhouse gases (GHG)-water vapor, CO2, nitrous oxide,
methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and ozone-trap heat in the
atmosphere instead of allowing it to radiate back to space. This is
essentially the same process by which glass traps heat in a greenhousethus the term "greenhouse effect." Except for CFCs, greenhouse gases
are natural components of the atmosphere, and the greenhouse effect
itself is a natural phenomenon. Without it the Earth would be about 60

1. The Woods Hole Research Center, The Warming of the Earth: A Beginner's Guide to
Understanding the Issue of Global Warming, at http://www.whrc.org/globalwarming/
warmingearth.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming: Climate, at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html (last modified Oct. 31,
2002).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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degrees cooler than it is today, and life as we know it would be
impossible!
Human activities such as deforestation and the burning of fossil
fuels are increasing the levels of these gases in the atmosphere, causing
an enhanced greenhouse effect and therefore trapping more heat. There
is substantial evidence that global warming is already underway. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported that the twentieth
century was the hottest in the last thousand years, that the nine hottest
years on record have occurred since 1987, and that 1998 was the hottest
year on record.6 Scientists' estimates of the total amount of surface
warming that will occur during the next century range from as little as
1.8 to as much as 11 degrees Fahrenheit. 7 In comparison, the global
average temperature change in 1816, the infamous "Year Without a
Summer" when crops 8failed around the world, was a drop of less than
one degree Fahrenheit.
Regardless of the amount of warming that occurs, not all regions
will feel the same effects. Some areas may become much hotter and drier,
while others in the far northern and southern hemispheres may
experience colder weather patterns. Due to predicted melting of the
polar ice caps and a subsequent rise in global sea levels of 15 to 95
centimeters over the next century, nearly a third of the world's homes
could be left underwater. 9 (See Figure 1.10) Severe storms and irregular
precipitation patterns will likely become more frequent and widespread,
and infectious diseases may increase due to an expansion of habitat for
disease carriers such as mosquitoes. Ultimately, the Earth's ecological
balance could become so radically upset that many species will be
unable to adapt to the swift changes and will likely become extinct."

5. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CENTER, REPORTING ON
CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE (2d ed., June 2000), available at
http://www.nsc.org/ehc/guidebks/climtoc.htm.
6. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. See Woods Hole Research Center, supranote 1.
9. G. TYLER MILLER, LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES, CONNECTIONS, AND
SOLUTIONS (2001).
10. This diagram was produced by Brett Cherrington for the Database for Use in
Schools project. Effects of Global Warming, at http://www.soton.ac.uk/-engenvir/
environment/transport/globwarm.htm (last updated Feb. 9, 1996).
11. Natural Resources Defense Council, Consequences of Global Warming, at http://
www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/fcons.asp (last visited Mar. 17,2003).
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Figure 1
Humans enhance the greenhouse effect primarily by burning
fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas). We do this every day in order to
keep our houses warm, our cities lit, and our cars running. The fuels we
use are carbon-based and formed over millions of years in thick deposits
of organic matter that became trapped between layers of rock in the
Earth's crust. When these fuels are extracted and burned, the carbon is
returned to the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide, the gas that
contributes most significantly to the enhanced greenhouse effect. In a
single year, an estimated 5.5 gigatons (1 gigaton = 1 billion tons) of
carbon (GtC) is added to the atmosphere as a result of fossil fuel
burning. 12 Electricity generation accounts for around 1.5 GtC and
13
transportation, industry, and domestic uses account for nearly 4 GtC.
Land use, in particular deforestation, also contributes to the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Cutting down and
burning forests not only releases carbon dioxide but also reduces an
important carbon storage reservoir, so that less carbon can be removed
or absorbed from the atmosphere. Deforestation and agricultural
techniques add about 2.0 GtC to the atmosphere each year.14
Other natural processes like plant respiration, sea-surface
exchange of gases, and natural decay of residue also give off carbon
dioxide, while plant photosynthesis and ocean activity absorb it. Each
12.

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNcIL, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CENTER, supra note 5, at ch.

3, availableat http://safety.webfirst.com/public/ehc/climate/chaptr3.pdf (last visited Mar.
17, 2003).
13. University College London, Centre for CO2 Technology, Introduction, at http://
www.chemeng.ucl.ac.uk/co2centre/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
14. Id.
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year, natural processes add and remove about the same amount of
the atmosphere. This amount is estimated at around 102
carbon
5 from
GtC.1
The amount of carbon in the atmosphere has changed
dramatically in the past 150 years. It has increased from 280 parts per
million (ppm) at the time of the Industrial Revolution to 367 ppm today,
an increase of 30 percent. 16 Most scientists believe that this is a direct
result of human contributions and various scenarios have been assessed
which indicate that by 2100, in the absence of emission control policies,
carbon dioxide concentrations could increase to levels as much as 150
percent higher than those of today.17
But carbon dioxide is not the only substance of concern. As one
publisher of scientific information explains:
Other greenhouse gases are less common than carbon
dioxide but have more potent effects. Nitrous oxide, for
example, is only one-one thousandth as common as CO2
but is 200-300 times as effective at trapping heat and
remains in the atmosphere for a much longer period of
time. Chlorofluorocarbons, which were not present in the
atmosphere at all prior to the Industrial Revolution, have
warming effects ranging from 3,000 to 13,000 times that of
CO2, and persist for up to 400 years.1 8
The most disconcerting fact about these statistics is the long lag
time built into the system. Even if all human contributions to the
greenhouse effect were to cease entirely, the atmosphere would return to
"natural" pre-industrial levels very slowly, by a few ppm every 50 years
or so.19 This means that it may be some time before we see the effects of
the millions of tons of CO2 and other greenhouse gases that have been
added to the atmosphere in recent decades. The fact remains that no one
really knows how much the climate will change, how much the human
contribution to greenhouse gases will and has affected it, or what the
long-term effects of global warming will be on ecosystems, species
distribution, and our own civilization.

15.

Id.

16.

R.P. Detwiler & C.A.S. Hall, Tropical Forestsand the Global Carbon Cycle, 239 Sci. 42,

44 (1998).
17. C.J. JEPMA, M. MUNASINGHE & B. BOLIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (1998).
18. Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, Environmental Hot Topics: Global Warming and the
Kyoto Protocol, at http://www.csa.com/hottopics/ern/Oljul/overview.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2003).
19. Id.
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International Response
Climate change looms as a defining issue of the twenty-first
century, because it pits the potential disruption of our global climate
system against the future of a fossil-fuel based economy. Policy makers
are the arbiters in this battle, attempting to negotiate between vastly
different interests, and challenged by significant uncertainties in science
and computer modeling.'
International efforts aimed at addressing and curtailing
emissions of greenhouse gases began over a decade ago. In 1988, the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) created the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the scientific, technical, and
economic bases of climate change policy." Understanding that strong
scientific support is essential to building the political will necessary to
effectively respond to climate change, the IPCC has played a significant
role in developing a scientific consensus about global warming. The
reports of the IPCC have been critical in shaping the continuing
international policy dialogue.
In 1990, the IPCC recommended a framework climate change
convention following the format of the Vienna Convention (on depletion
of the ozone layer). The model was accepted and the U.N. General Assembly established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC)
shortly after the Second World Climate Conference in November of 1990.
Charged with producing an agreement to be signed at the Rio Earth
Summit in June 1992, the INC began working in Chantilly, Virginia, in
February 1992, during a record heat wave.2
Prior to the Climate Convention, many countries had already
committed to reducing GHG emissions, while others, like the United
States, were reluctant to enter into any binding agreements. The
European Community (EC), for example, was prepared to return its joint
CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 because of individual
country commitments by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Australia,
Austria, and Norway.3 Japan had suggested that both an overall
framework and specific measures should be decided upon during the
negotiations. The United States was reluctant to agree on exact dates or
targets and wanted to rely heavily on the phasing out of CFCs in order to

20. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 609 (1998).

&

DURWOOD

ZAELKE,

INTERNATIONAL

21. Id. at 610.
22. Donald Goldberg, As the World Burns: Negotiating the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 5 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 239,239 (1993).
23. Id. at 240.

Winter 2003]

EVOLUTION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

reach potential emissions reductions. 2 Many objected to this notion and
considered it disingenuous because of recent agreements under the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, which
detailed the curbing of CFCs by all Parties. 5
As negotiations in anticipation of the Summit continued, it
became increasingly clear that the United States was not going to make
any decisions lightly and the original text of the document was cut down
to a third of its size in order to encourage U.S. participation. Much of the
once bold and decisive text was put into brackets, indicating that it was
controversial and had not yet been fully adopted as the language of the
agreement. The commitment section of the draft acknowledged both that
an agreement was not achievable if the United States declined being a
signatory and the recognition of this belief by the other Parties.
Consequently, the Summit at Rio failed to establish any firm resolutions
or targets and the Chairman placed the blame for the weak and
26
ambiguous GHG commitment language squarely on the United States.
The central objective of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), as established in 1992, can be found in
Article 2, which requires the Parties to achieve "stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system." 27 The use of the language "stabilization of greenhouse gases"
might be the greatest failure of the agreement, implying some sort of
balancing act rather than a straight reduction in emissions.
Richard Benedick, in his essay, A Case of Dgja vu, which was written just before the UNFCCC, discussed the implications of an agreement
on climate change that lacked any mandatory provisions for the reduction of GHGs.& He revisits the negotiations during the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the successes of mandating a timetable for deep cuts in consumption of CFCs even though at
the time scientists warned that adequate technology did not yet exist to
achieve those cuts. 29 This radical approach to international negotiations
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, art. II,
31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
28. Richard Benedick, Essay: A Case of Dgja Vu, SCI. AM., Apr. 1992, at 610.
29. Benedick points out, "The current debate about greenhouse warming conveys a
distinct sense of d~j vu. The world again confronts a classic situation: weighing the risks of
action and inaction in the face of uncertainties. Short-term costs loom large; long-term
dangers seem remote. Nature, however, is not in the habit of providing convenient earlywarning systems. So astounded were scientists in the early 1980s to detect a dramatic
seasonal drop in ozone levels over Antarctica that they spent two years rechecking their
data. They soon discovered that satellites had dutifully been recording the ozone collapse
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was the first time that policy makers departed from the customary accommodation of environmental regulation to commercial convenience.
Considering that the UNFCCC was to be modeled on the Vienna Convention and the resulting Montreal Protocol, it was hoped that any
agreements reached in Rio would have the same "bite." This, however,
was not to be.
The resulting UNFCCC was in many ways disappointing to
environmentalists, but given the vast complexities inherent in the climate
change issue it may nonetheless be viewed as a positive step toward the
control of GHGs. Perhaps the most controversial provisions of the
Convention were those that addressed the specific commitments of the
Parties. The Parties were essentially divided into three categories: all
Parties; Annex I Parties, which includes all industrialized countries; and
Annex II Parties, which includes all industrialized countries except those
from the former Soviet bloc in a process of economic transition. Article
4(1) places certain information and data collecting requirements on all
Parties. Article 4(2)(a) subjects the Annex I countries to additional
requirements, including most notably the obligation to "adopt national
policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate
change, by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs." This
language is not tied legally to any specific target, but Article 4(2)(b)
requires the developed countries to provide detailed information on
their policies as well as their projected anthropogenic emissions "with
the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels .... "
The framework established for the continued implementation of
the Convention can be found in Article (4)(2)(d), which details the duties
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention (CoP). The CoP is
responsible for periodically meeting and reviewing the adequacy of
for several years but had not raised any alert because the computers were programmed to
reject such extreme data as anomalies.
The Antarctic ozone hole is an example of what scientists call a nonlinear response;
that is the ozone layer kept absorbing ever more chlorine from man-made sources without
revealing any problem, until the concentrations reached a breaking point, and collapse
ensued. With respect to greenhouse warming, scientists warn that billions of tons of carbon
dioxide and other gases being emitted by modern industrial economies constitute an
unpredictable experiment on the atmosphere.
Even the most dire predictions are now shown to have underestimated ozone loss by
CFCs. Had CFCs been permitted to continue growing, they would have wrought
irreparable damage on the ozone layer. And yet, at the time, powerful voices in
government and industry strongly opposed regulations, on the grounds of incomplete
scientific evidence. Under these circumstances, the lesson for policy makers seems clear: if
we are to err, let us err on the side of caution. The very existence of scientific uncertainty
about global warming should lead us to action rather than delay, especially when most of
the international scientific community persistently warns of the risks." Id. at 610.
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subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 4(2) "in the light of the best available
scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts,
as well as relevant technical, social, and economic information." A
deadline for the second review of Article 4 was set for December 31,
1998, and "thereafter at regular intervals determined by the [CoP], until
the objective of the Convention is met. " 30
Although the 1992 Convention did not include a legally binding
obligation to meet 1990 levels of GHG emissions by 2000, Article 4
required at least that developed-country Parties try to do this. By the
time the first CoP was scheduled to meet in Berlin in 1995 two things
seemed clear. First, the original target of freezing emissions at 1990 levels
for Annex I countries was not going to be sufficient to meet the
Convention's Article 2 objective "to achieve stabilization of GHG
concentrations at a safe level". Second, few developed countries were
even going to come close to meeting the 1990-level freeze."
Environmentalists and most developing countries came to Berlin
hoping to persuade the Annex I countries to step up their level of
commitment. A group of developing countries drew up a document that
became known as the "Berlin Mandate," which would establish a
timetable for developed countries to negotiate a protocol with clear
"quantifiable limitation and reduction objectives" (QELROs) 32-a new
term for "targets and timetables." It concluded that Article 4, paragraph
2(a) and (b) of the UNFCCC was inadequate and needed to be
strengthened through the adoption of a "protocol or another legal
instrument." 33 Article 6 established a deadline "to ensure completion of
the work as early as possible in 1997 with a view to adopting the results
at the third session of the Conference of the Parties [in Kyoto]."M
Around the same time as the Berlin Mandate and the first CoP,
the IPCC released a report that became one of the most significant
milestones in the evolution of the international climate change
agreements. Some 2,000 scientists, experts and government officials
prepared and signed off on the broadest international consensus ever on
the issue. Based on 133 scientific publications, the report delivered a
widely quoted conclusion: "The balance of evidence suggests that there
is a discernible human influence on global climate."3 This conclusion
ignited serious debate, pitting the great majority of atmospheric
30. UNFCCC, supranote 27, at art. 4(2)(d).
31. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 645.
32. Id.
33. Conclusion of Outstanding Issues and Adoption of Decisions: The Berlin Mandate,
Apr. 7, 1995, FCCC/CP/1995/L.14.
34. Id. at art. 6.
35. Miguel Llanos, A Consensus Emerges Around Global Warming, MSNBC, Jan. 10, 1998,
at http://www.msnbc.com/news/106332.asp (last visited Mar. 26,2003).
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scientists and environmentalists who endorsed the IPCC report against
some extremely vocal skeptics funded largely by the fossil fuel
industry.6 Despite the controversy, the report provided one of the most
important catalysts for the negotiations about to ensue.
At CoP-1 in Berlin, the United States continued its lack of clear
commitment, but their position was an increasingly isolated one.
Because of increased public pressure and the recent findings of the IPCC,
the United States did announce that defined targets would be supported,
but they were silent on what specific levels they would support. 7 They
remained silent throughout the next year even though Europe and many
developing countries were looking to the United States to show
leadership on the issue. Instead, President Clinton announced that he
would use the time remaining before the third Conference of the Parties
at Kyoto to educate the American public about the need for GHG
reductions.m
The Europeans and others were not pleased with the U.S.
position. British Prime Minister Tony Blair indirectly criticized the
United States by saying,
[S]ome of the greatest industrialized nations.. .have not
lived up to their promises. To be really effective, we must
act globally. At Kyoto, industrial countries must agree to
legally binding targets for significant reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions during the first decade of the
next century. The biggest responsibility falls on those
countries with the biggest emissions. We in Europe have
36. Between 1991 and 1995, according to a study called Pollution Politics by the
California Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG), oil companies and automakers
spent nearly $34 million to influence public policy in the state, the sum included $29
million in lobbying; $3.97 million in donations to statewide and legislative candidates; and
$945,000 specifically to the gubernatorial campaign of Republican Governor Pete Wilson.
WSPA's lobbying expenditures were $7,349,718 in the period, the CALPIRG study shows.
The cash-rich auto and oil companies-acting together or not-made a formidable
lobbying team, their slick PR materials preying mostly on fear of new taxes and higher car
prices. "We oppose the assessment of nearly $18 billion in hidden taxes and other costs to
promote electric, natural gas and other alternative-fueled vehicles," read a CAHT petition.
A flyer added, "Once again, the vast majority of motorists who use gasoline are forced to
subsidize the minority that uses alternative fuels. That's just not right." Jim Motavali, The
Ties That Blind: Big Oil Goes Hunting for Electric Cars in California, EMAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr.
1997, at http://www.emagazine.com/march-april_1997/0397feat2.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2003).
37. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEwoRK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, US SECOND
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION: CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, 1997 SUBMISSION OF THE UNrrED
STATES OF AMERICA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE

CHANGE (U.S. Department of State Publication No. 10496), availableat http://www.unfccc.
int/resource/docs/natc/usnc2.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
38. Id.
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put our cards on the table. It is time for the special pleading
to stop and for others to follow suit. If we fail at Kyoto, we
fail our children, because the consequences will be felt in
their lifetime. And we must all deliver on the commitments
we make. Setting new targets means little if old ones are
ignored.39
The G-77' Chairman, David Mwakawago, was even clearer when he
said, "[President Clinton] articulated the problems very clearly, but
when it came to global action, joining the rest of humanity to address
4
them, there wasn't very much there." '
Clinton's announcement that he would build political will over
the next six months rallied both sides of the climate debate in the United
States to encourage support for either a stronger or a weaker"convention.
Just a few months after the June 1996 speech, U.S. industry announced a
$13 million dollar campaign under the ambiguous name of the "Global
Climate Information Project."2 With the slogan "It's not global, and it
won't work," 43 they first attacked the Climate Change Convention as
being unfair to the United States because it let developing countries off
the hook. Other ads in the campaign claimed that energy prices would
rise more than 20 percent.4 Over 1500 utilities, trade associations, labor
unions, and other corporations signed on to an advertisement asking the
President not to "rush into an unwise and unfair United Nations agreement that's bad for America. " 4
Congress added their support to this position by passing Senate
Resolution 98 urging the President not to agree to any convention that
did not include developing countries and that would have a significant
effect on the U.S. economy.4 The Byrd Resolution, as it has since been
39. 10 Downing Street, Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair to the UN General
Assembly-Monday 23rd June 1997, at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Pagel045.asp
(last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
40. There are 153 non-Annex I/B countries. Of these, 130 are members of the group G77. The chair of G-77 rotates among the countries on an annual basis. During the 1990s the
chairs were Bolivia, Ghana, Pakistan, Colombia, Algeria, Philippines, Costa Rica, Tanzania,
Indonesia, and Guyana. Group of Seventy-Seven at the United Nations, What Is the Group of
Seventy-Seven?, at http://www.g77.org/main/main.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
41. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Fifth Session, Apr. 7-25,
1997, at http://www.agora21.org/cdd5/cdden00.html (last visited May 5,2003).
42. Common Cause, Some Like It Hot: As Global Temperatures Rise, Contributions
Flow to Parties and Candidates, at http://www.commoncause.org/publications/
hot/pgO4.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Joby Warrick, White House Fosters Awareness of Global Warming but Hedges on Policy,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6,1997, at A9.
46. S.Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
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referred to, strongly influenced the subsequent negotiations in Kyoto
because the U.S. Senate would have to ratify any agreements made.
Environmental groups countered the attacks by launching media
and public information campaigns. Some environmental groups attacked
Vice President Gore, quoting passages from his book, Earth in the Balance,
and running advertisements with the words "withdrawn by the author"
superimposed over the copy of the book's cover.47 A scientists' statement
from over 2600 leading scientists was handed to the President on June
18, 1997, endorsing strong and clear commitments at Kyoto.0 A similar
statement from over 1000 leading economists argued that the United
States could meet the objectives of the climate convention without
harming the national economy. 49 Even a Department of Energy study
concluded that energy efficient technologies could allow the United
States to reach 1990 levels by the year 2010 with little or no overall costs
to the economy.5 Despite these and other efforts, the Administration's
position could not be softened.
The Clinton Administration finally announced its policy on
October 22, 1997. The proposal specified a target of reducing emissions
to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, and further unspecified reductions
by 2017.51 To meet these deadlines the President outlined a program of $5
billion in tax and other incentives to spur energy efficient technologies;
endorsed the concept of an international pollution trading system that
would allow for reduced costs of compliance; and emphasized the
restructuring of the electric industry concurrent with deregulation. 2 The
Administration's position drew immediate criticism from both U.S.
environmentalists and industry groups, and by governments around the
world, who believed the dominant role of the United States in the
international political system warranted a stronger position. However,
with the U.S. position finally publicized, the major proposals for targets
and timetables leading up to Kyoto could be identified. (See Figure 2.' 3)

47. HUNTER ET AL, supra note 20, at 650.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 650.
51. Id. at 656.
52. Id.
53. HUNTER ET AL, supra note 20, at Box 10-2: Negotiating Positions on GHG
Reductions.
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Figure 2

AOSIS

20% below 1990 levels by 2005

G-77

35% below 1990 levels by 2020

European Union

7.5% below 1990 levels by 2005; 15% below by 2015

Russia

1990 levels by 2010

Czech Republic

5%below 1990 levels by 2005; 15% below by 2010

Eastern Europe

1990 levels by 2005

Peru

15% below 1990 levels by 2005

Brazil

30 %below 1990 levels by 2020

Switzerland

10% below 1990 levels by 2010 based on per capita consumption

Philippines
Japan

20% below 1990 levels by 2005; 40% below by 2020
0-5% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012, depending on economic
factors

United States

1990 levels by 2008 to 2012; further unspecified cuts by 2017
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"These 10 days could change the history of humankind." This is
what Japanese Foreign minister Keizo Obuchi told the 2000 delegates at
the third Conference of the Parties (CoP-3) that met in Kyoto, Japan, in
1997. The delegates, who represented over 150 nations, were trying to
forge a treaty that would mandate reductions in the emission of
greenhouse gases. Not since the 1992 Earth Summit had so much press
and attention been paid to an international environmental negotiation as
was paid to the Kyoto negotiations. Thousands of official delegates,
reporters, scientists, activists, and industry officials arrived not knowing
how the conference would turn out. The external interest was so heavy
that failure to reach an agreement would be deemed an embarrassing
failure to many of the governments.Many predicted that the initial U.S. negotiating position, which
called for a return to 1990 emission levels by 2012 and the inclusion of
developing countries in any treaty, would hinder any potential agreement. "We are perfectly prepared to walk away from an agreement that
we don't think will work," Vice President Gore said before heading to
Kyoto to join the U.S. delegation.m
54. Id. at 649.
55. PBS, Online Forum: Environmental Diplomacy: Analysis of the Kyoto Global Climate
Conference (Dec. 12, 1997), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/december97/kyoto_
12-12.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
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Despite a rocky beginning to the conference, negotiators were
able to produce an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases after going
into an eleventh day of talks. The agreement called for 159 countries to
reduce their aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2 percent
below 1990 levels by 2012.-6 Each country had an individual reduction
target to reach the worldwide reduction of 5.2 percent, although there
were a few nations that would be allowed to increase their emissions.
Under the draft proposal, the United States would reduce its emissions
by seven percent below 1990 levels, the European Union's emissions
would drop by eight percent and Japan would reduce emissions by six
percent. Australia, on the other hand, was allowed to increase its
emissions by five percent.57
Going into the conference, the United States had proposed
stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2012. The European Union had
called for all developed nations to reduce their emissions by 15 percent
by 2010, while Japan had called for a 5 percent reduction. (See Figure 2.)
The deal finally reached appears to be a compromise between those
positions.
Consensus was also reached regarding the gases covered in the
treaty. The United States had called for any treaty negotiated in Kyoto to
cover six greenhouse gases-three natural (carbon dioxide, CO 2;
methane, CH 4 ; and nitrous oxide, N20) and three man-made
(hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs; perfluorocarbons, PFCs; and sulfur
hexafluoride, SF)-while Japan and the European Union only wanted
negotiations to cover the three natural gases.5 Ultimately it was decided
that all six gases would be part of any deal.59
Of significance to the United States was the provision that only
38 developed nations were required to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions while the remaining developing nations would only have to
set voluntary limits. 60That provision appeared to doom any possibility of
U.S. ratification considering that the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 on the Byrd
Resolution to demand the participation of developing nations in any
agreement.6 The exclusion of developing countries remains one of the
main criticisms of the Protocol by the United States. In the end, however,

56. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(adopted Dec. 10, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
57. Id.
58. See PBS, supra note 55.
59. See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 56.
60. Id.
61. Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and
United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J. 27,29 (1999).
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the United States, represented by Vice-President Al Gore, signed the
treaty on November 12, 1998.62
Legal Effect of Signing the Kyoto Protocol
Merely signing the Kyoto Protocol does not make the United
States bound by the agreement. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated as a
means of implementing the UNFCCC to which the Senate gave its advice
and consent on October 7, 1992 and by which the United States is legally
bound. 63 The Framework Convention set a general objective of stabilizing
GHGs and anticipated that the Parties would adopt protocols to the
Convention in order to achieve that objective. However, such protocols
must themselves be ratified by the participating states before they can
become legally binding.'
The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and signed by the Clinton
Administration, and the administration indicated its intent to seek
ratification. However, the Protocol was not ratified nor was it ever sent
to the Senate for its advice and consent.6 The Protocol will not enter into
force until it has been ratified by at least 55 states representing at least 55
in 1990.6
percent of the total industrialized carbon dioxide emissions
Both steps-ratification by the United States and entry into force
internationally-are necessary for the Protocol to be legally binding on
the United States.
Though signing the Protocol in itself does not make it legally
binding on the United States, it does carry some consequences. First,
signature authenticates the text of the agreement because it represents
"the assent of the negotiating states that a given text expresses the
agreement they have reached." 67 Second, it initiates the process by which
the United States could become legally bound. Signature of the Protocol
is essentially a political statement of approval and represents "at least a
moral obligation to seek [its] ratification."6 Finally, signature of a treaty
or protocol obligates a state to "refrain from acts that would defeat the
62.

David M. Ackerman, Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions About the Kyoto

Protocol, CAMBRIDGE ScI. ABSTRAcTS, at http://www.csa.com/hottopics/em/Oljul/2kyoto.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
63. 138 CONG. REC. S33521-27 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992).
64. Ackerman, supra note 62.
65. Susan R. Fletcher, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol, CAMBRIDGE SC.
ABSTRACTS, at http://www.csa.com/hottopics/em/Oljul/1-kyoto.html (last visited Mar.
26,2003).
66. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 56, art. 24.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312
(1987).
68. Id.
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object and purpose of the agreement." 69 It is difficult to determine what
kinds of actions "defeat the object and purpose of [an] agreement," but it
is suggested that one criterion may be whether a particular action has a
"negative effect on what would be a state's obligations under
a treaty
which is irreversible."70
Major Provisions of the Kyoto Protocol
During negotiations in Kyoto, little progress was made on key
issues until the final days and hours of the Conference. There was wide
disparity among the Parties especially in regards to three topics: (1) the
amount of binding reductions in GHGs to be required and the gases to
be included in these requirements, (2) whether developing countries
should be part of the requirements for GHG reductions, and (3) whether
to include emissions trading and joint implementation.
1. Emissions Reductions
The United States would be obligated under the Kyoto Protocol
to a cumulative reduction in its GHG emissions of seven percent below
1990 levels, averaged over the commitment period 2008 to 2012.7'Annex
B to the Protocol lists 39 countries and the amount of reductions, in
percentages, required of each. These range from 92 percent (a reduction
of eight percent) for most European countries, to 110 percent (an increase
of 10 percent) for Iceland.? Based on projections of the growth of
emissions using current technologies and processes, the reduction in
GHG emissions required of the United States is between 20 percent and
zero percent below where it would otherwise be by the 2008-2012
budget period.'
Inclusion of GHG "sinks," 7' which the Protocol adopted as urged
by the United States,? and emissions trading would make the ultimate
reductions substantially lower. The two separate concepts of sinks and
emissions trading, and specifically how they can be used to meet a coun-

69. Id. at § 312(3).
70. Id. cmt. at 174.
71. Fletcher, supranote 65.
72. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 56, Annex B.
73. Larry Parker & John Blodgett, Global Climate Change: Reducing Greenhouse GasesHow Much from What Baseline, CRS Report for Congress No. 98-235 ENR, available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clhm13.cfm?&CFID=7243272&CF
TOKEN=7269030 (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
74. GHGs, especially CO2, are absorbed by a number of processes in forests, soils, and
other ecosystems. These are called sinks.
75. Fletcher, supra note 65.

Winter 2003]

EVOLUTION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

try's overall emissions reduction obligations, are responsible for many of
the difficulties surrounding ratification of the Protocol.
2. Developing Countries' Responsibilities
As already mentioned, the United States, through the Byrd
76
Resolution, has taken a firm position that "meaningful participation" of
developing countries in commitments made in the Protocol is critical
both to achieving the goals of the treaty and to its approval by the U.S.
Senate. The Kyoto negotiations concluded without such commitments
and the Clinton Administration indicated that it would not submit the
Protocol for Senate consideration until those commitments were made.7
The Protocol does call on all Parties, developed and developing, to take a
number of steps to formulate national and regional programs to improve
local emission factors, activity data, models, and national inventories of
GHG emissions and sinks that remove these gases from the
atmosphere. 78 All Parties are also committed to formulate, implement,
publish, and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional
programs containing measures to mitigate climate change.7 They are
also committed to cooperating in the promotion and transfer of
8
environmentally sound technologies o and in scientific and technical
research on the climate system.8
3. Emissions Tradingand Joint Implementation
Article 6 allows for and outlines emissions trading in which a
Party included in the Annex I countries "may transfer to, or acquire
from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from
projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or
greenhouse gases.,82
enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of
These projects, however, can only be used as supplemental measures to
domestic actions.3 The added language concerning "supplemental
measures" makes it clear that a country cannot meet its entire reduction
objective by relying on emissions trading. This raises the question of
what proportion of a country's obligations could be met through this
mechanism.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
Fletcher, supra note 65.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 56, art. 10(a).
Id. art. 10(b).
Id. art. 10(c).
Id. art. 10(d).
Id. art. 6.
Id.
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Another major mechanism for meeting obligations in the
Protocol is provided in Article 12 by the establishment of a Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) through which joint implementation
(JI) between developed and developing countries would occur. The
United States pushed hard for JI and negotiations resulted in the
agreement that developed Annex I countries could contribute financially
to projects aimed at reducing emissions in developing countries and use
any actual reductions in those countries as credit towards their own
reduction obligations.'
A number of specific concerns related to the rules on how
emissions trading and joint implementation would work were left at
Kyoto to be negotiated and resolved in subsequent meetings. In the years
since Kyoto, it has become increasingly clear that these are extremely
complex issues that need to be well defined if they are to contribute
successfully to the original goals of the UNFCCC.
Buenos Aires Action Plan
Although it had been expected that the November 1998 CoP-4
meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, would resolve some of the more
difficult issues left unresolved in Kyoto, it became clear in the year
leading up to CoP-4 that parties were far from agreement on all of the
issues.8 Therefore, the Parties arrived in Buenos Aires with an agenda
focused on formulating an "action plan" that would allow for the needed
additional work to be done. The plan was titled the Buenos Aires Action
Plan (BAPA) and was scheduled to be completed by the end of 2000 at
The Hague during the Sixth Conference of the Parties.' The major focus
of BAPA was on the formulation of rules and guidelines for the "marketbased mechanisms" of JI, emissions trading, and the CDM. The critical
issues to be considered included how much of a country's emission
reduction requirement could be met through these mechanisms, which
the United States argued should be limitless and which the European
Union felt should be supplementary to domestic reductions; how
emission units would be tracked; and what penalties would accompany
the trading of "false" credits.87 The Plan also focused on the compliance
mechanisms of the Protocol (how it would be enforced) and the issues
concerning transfer and development of technology.'

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. art. 12.
Fletcher, supranote 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The other major issue under active negotiation, but outside the
scope of BAPA, was how to define carbon sinks and the role they would
play in the Protocol. During negotiations in 1999 the IPCC released a
report indicating that a large amount of carbon could be stored in a
variety of sinks including not only forests, but soils, vegetation, and
grazing lands.8 This was important to the United States due to its large
land area and extensive potential for greater absorption of carbon due to
land management changes.
Talks began at The Hague on November 13th and centered
initially on the Buenos Aires Action Plan. The Conference quickly
degraded into a major controversy over the proposal by the United
States to allow credit for carbon sinks in forest and agricultural land as a
major portion of their reduction obligations.9 After calculations, the U.S.
credits from carbon sinks appeared to represent about 125 million tons of
carbon against a likely need to reduce emissions by 600 million tons in
order to meet the seven percent reduction target by 2008-2012.91 Heated
opposition by the European Union and other countries ensued and the
negotiations at The Hague collapsed without any agreements
whatsoever. In early 2001, it was announced that talks would resume in
the last two weeks of July at meetings in Bonn, Germany, a session now
referred to as "COP-6 bis" because it represented a continuation of the
COP-6 meeting suspended at The Hague.
The White House Effect
On March 13, 2001, President George W. Bush wrote to four
Republican Senators informing them that he would not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. A few days later he bluntly defended his decision at a
Washington press conference by stating, "I will not accept a plan that
will harm our economy and hurt American workers... first things first are
"
the people who live in America; that's my priority. 9 A few days later
Vice President Dick Cheney, like Bush a Texas oil-industry veteran,
announced a new American policy of generating more energy rather
than conserving existing supplies. He predicted that the United States
would need between 1300 and 1900 new power stations in the next
twenty years, most of them burning coal, which he said "[is] not the

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Murray Sayle, After George W. Bush, the Deluge, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, June 21,
2001, at http://www.Irb.co.uk/v23/n12/say101_.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
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cleanest source of energy,
but [is] the most plentiful source of affordable
93
energy in the country."
Europeans began calling Bush the "Toxic Texan" and Nature
magazine published an article claiming that Bush's decision, together
with other decisions easing restrictions on ergonomics and the levels of
arsenic permitted in Americans' drinking water, "[made it] abundantly
clear where his Administration [stood] on matters in which scientists
would normally play an important advisory role. It stands firmly with
the employers and polluters who helped to pay for Bush's singularly
unimpressive election victory last November, and damn the scientific
evidence." 4 Bush replied by stating that "America's unwillingness to
embrace a flawed treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as
any abdication of responsibility. To the contrary, my administration is
committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate change." 5
Bonn Synopsis
In July 2001, more than 160 governments came together in Bonn,
Germany, to complete the operating rules for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
requiring 55 countries representing 55 percent of industrialized country
emissions to ratify the treaty before entry into force. The United States,
representing such a significant portion of industrialized emissions, made
the Kyoto agreement achievable only if Japan, the European Union, and
Russia all decided to ratify. The U.S. position dramatically affected the
climate of the conference, considering that negotiations had been going
on for nearly a decade and now it seemed like the situation was hopeless. Jan Pronk, the Dutch Environmental Minister and President of the
conference, urged Parties to take the necessary steps towards ratification
even if one nation felt it could not join in (indirectly referring to the
United States).96
The Conference was ultimately successful in achieving one
major resolution. The issue of how compliance would be achieved for
those countries not meeting their targets was finally agreed upon despite
last-minute hold-outs Japan, Australia, and Canada.97 The compliance
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Discusses
Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/06/20010611-2.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
96. Id.
97. The agreement provides solutions to the key issues that the technical negotiators
had been unable to resolve by establishing the following:
0 There will be a compliance committee comprised of two "branches."
The facilitative branch will be available to assist all Parties-both devel-
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mechanism established at Bonn was described as one that will "stand out
as the 'cutting edge' for compliance mechanisms in international
environmental law... [and] it will provide a strong basis for.. .evaluating
compliance, as well as responding to cases of non-compliance during the
" 98
first commitment period and beyond. Though several issues were left
undecided, the Parties left the Conference believing that ratification
could be achieved without U.S. participation and final negotiations were
scheduled for the Seventh Conference of the Parties in Marrakech,
Morocco, in November 2001.

oped (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I)-in their implementation of
the Protocol. Importantly, it will serve as an "early warning system" for
Annex I Parties that may have trouble meeting their emissions targets.
The enforcement branch will serve as a judicial-like forum for determining
whether an Annex I Party has (1) met its target, (2) complied with its
monitoring and reporting requirements and (3) met the eligibility tests for
participating in the mechanisms. When the enforcement branch finds that
a Party has failed to comply with one of these obligations, the enforcement
branch will decide upon the appropriate consequence(s) for the Party.
0 The membership of both the facilitative and enforcement branches will
be based upon equitable geographical representation. This was a dramatic
victory for the G-77 and China. "Composition" of the enforcement branch
was the final, seemingly most intractable issue for negotiators to agree
upon. We had predicted that the Umbrella Group would never consent to
equitable geographic representation; yet, in the final moments, Australia
finally conceded and the Pronk political agreement became a reality.
• There will be specific consequences when an Annex I Party fails to
comply with its emissions target: (1) For every tonne of emissions by
which a Party exceeds its target, 1.3 tonnes will be deducted from its
assigned amount for the subsequent commitment period. That rate may be
increased for future commitment periods. (2) The Party will prepare a
detailed plan explaining how it will meet its reduced target for the
subsequent commitment period. The enforcement branch will have the
power to review the plan and assess whether or not it is likely to work. (3)
The Party will not be able to use Article 17 emissions trading to sell parts
of its emissions allocation ("assigned amount").
• After the enforcement branch determines that a Party has exceeded its
target, the Party will have the right to appeal the decision to the supreme
body of the Protocol, the COP/MOP. The branch's decision will stand
unless a three-fourths majority of the COP/MOP votes to overturn it. The
appeal provision was a significant concession to the G-77 and China, who
wanted assurances that decisions of the enforcement branch could not be
made completely independently from COP/MOP oversight.
Glen Wiser, CIEL's Summary of the Compliance Mechanism, CIEL, at http://www.ciel.org/
Climate/bonncmsummary.html (last visited Mar. 26,2003).
98. Id.
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United States Under Attack
On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced what
might be remembered as the single greatest tragedy in its history when
thousands died in the collapse of the World Trade Center. British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, keen to be seen as Bush's closest ally in the war on
terrorism, hinted that a new sense of multi-lateralism after the attacks
could extend into other areas. "The power of the international
community to fight terrorism... [could be] used to improve the
environment," Blair said at a Labour Party conference in October.9 He
added, "We could defeat climate change if we choose to. Kyoto is right.
We will implement it and call upon all other nations to do so."'00
Others were not as confident that the attacks would have any
effect on U.S. involvement in Kyoto negotiations. Christian Engelhofer,
an energy-expert at the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy
Studies, said it was now less likely than ever that the U.S. State
Department would come up with an alternative plan for fighting climate
change, which the United States said it would put forward after Bonn. 1 '
"One thing is clear, the United States will not rejoin the Kyoto Protocol,
this has not changed since September 11th," said Engelhofer. "Nobody
expects a 'big idea' anymore.. .After Bonn what would be the point of a
counter-proposal? Bonn was very clear-people said 'we have invested
10 years [negotiating Kyoto], we will stick with it."' 1°2 Belgian Energy
Minister and head of the EU delegation at Bonn Olivier Deleuze said the
European Union would not push the United States to return to Kyoto,
but it would push the rest of the world to move forward regardless of
the U.S. position. "We might have total unreserved solidarity with the
U.S. in relation to the attacks, but that does not mean we would change
our position on Kyoto."10 3 Rob Bradley of Climate Network Europe
added, "In the near future, climate change has pretty much slipped off
the U.S. agenda. It isn't really possible to criticize them for that... [but] it
does re-emphasize that for the time being the rest of the world needs to
go it alone." 1°' And, as the Parties prepared for Marrakech and CoP-7,
they were ready to do just that.

99. Multilateralism Unlikely for Kyoto, CINA DAILY, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2001-10-15/38386.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104.

Id.
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CoP-7
"The world has now agreed on the most complex environmental
°
treaty ever and the first which is legally binding."' 5 The Marrakech
Accords drafted during CoP-7 effectively completed the work under
BAPA and ultimately set the stage for countries to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and bring it into force. t 6 The United States participated in the
talks but maintained its position that it refused to ratify. Major decisions
were made and most, if not all, of the demands made previously by the
United States over the past decade were firmly incorporated into the
agreement. This was likely due to the fact that key players such as Japan
and Russia, who sought many of the provisions concurrent with the U.S.
position, held strong bargaining positions because their acceptance of the
final text was necessary to give the Protocol a chance for ratification.7
All three of the market-based mechanisms-JI, emissions trading, and
the CDM-were incorporated along with the principle that countries
could receive credit toward their emissions targets for carbon absorbed
by forests, soils, vegetation, grassland, and other sinks.' "There is an
agreement by everyone on everything," said French environment
minister Yves Cochet. 109
While the Parties deserve great recognition for finally settling
disputes and preparing for ratification and entry into force at CoP-7, the
Protocol arguably lacks the type of commitments necessary to effectively
combat global warming. The recognition of the three market-based
mechanisms and carbon sinks as valid methods for reducing emissions
will likely draw attention from efforts aimed at energy efficient
technologies and reducing global consumption of non-renewable fossil
fuels. The future of global warming is uncertain, but the reality is that
the world has finally taken its first step toward curbing overall human
contribution to the greenhouse effect.

105. One World After All: Quite a Week for Global Governance, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 17,
2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,3604,596326,00.htn-l (last
visited Mar. 26,2003).
106. PEW Centre on Global Climate Change, Summary of the Marrakech Accords on
9
Climate Change,at http://www.pewclimate.org/cop7/update_110 01.cfm (last visited Mar.
26, 2003).
107. Climate Conference Nears End, BBC NEWS, Nov. 9, 2001, availableat http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_16470000/1647894.stm (last visited Mar. 26,2003).
108. Id.
109. Climate Conference Reaches Deal, BBC NEWs, Nov. 10, 2001, availableat http://news.
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid-1648000/1648515.stm (last visited Mar. 26,2003).
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CONCLUSION
It is difficult to know exactly why the United States, which
dominates the world economy and often leads the way on international
law, would suddenly back out of the Kyoto negotiations altogether.
Certainly by not being a party to the Protocol, the United States will
avoid any consequences associated with non-compliance of emissions
reduction targets, but likewise they will not be able to take advantage of
many of the benefits associated with the agreement. Nevertheless, they
will possibly benefit from a more stable climate through no action of
their own. The United States has isolated itself from the rest of the world
on the climate change issue and the ramifications of this decision will be
felt over the coming years.
One explanation for the sudden withdrawal of the United States
from climate negotiations could be that the United States was attempting
to establish a strategic position. Certainly the United States was not
going to accept any agreement that did not include provisions for market
mechanisms and carbon sinks, and because the United States finally
backed out completely, the only possibility for ratification lay in
convincing Russia and Japan, who had many of the same demands as the
United States, to join. This forced the Parties to give wide allowances in
order to encourage total participation. In the end, whether the United
States was strategically positioning itself or not, nearly all previous
requests by the United States were incorporated to encourage
commitments from the more reluctant Parties and increase the chances of
ratification.
Regardless of why the United States backed out, there are
definite consequences associated with non-involvement. Even if climate
change proves not to be the threat that some claim it will be, an entire
international legal, political, and economic structure is now being
created. This structure will substantially affect the global economic
environment. And, notwithstanding the rejection of the Protocol by the
United States, American-based transnational corporations will surely
operate in many of the nations that have ratified, or are in the process of
ratifying, the Kyoto Protocol. In the face of these dynamics alone-not to
mention the prospect that climate change could truly be a threat-the
American corporate community must lead, both in its own interest and
in the interest of the world community that it serves.
In the short-term one might expect the U.S. economy to thrive as
fossil fuels are consumed at ever-increasing rates. Perhaps industry will
even grow as Americans continue to depend on the cheap and
convenient sources of energy to which they have become so accustomed.
But what happens when those sources of energy are no longer readily
available and prices begin to skyrocket? And what happens when, at the

Winter 2003]

EVOLUTION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

309

same time, the United States has not adequately prepared itself for such
an event by developing new technologies and the market mechanisms by
which to implement them? The United States might suddenly find itself
in a difficult situation with little bargaining power. If and when the
economy suffers and thousands lose their jobs, America and the rest of
the world will not have forgotten March 2001, when George W. Bush
said that Americans come first.
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APPENDIX: KYOTO PROTOCOL-STATUS OF RATIFICATION
Notes
R =
At =
Ap =
Ac =

Ratification
Acceptance
Approval
Accession

COUNTRY
1. ANTIGUA & BARBUDA
2. ARGENTINA
3. AUSTRALIA
4. AUSTRIA
5. AZERBAIJAN
6. BAHAMAS
7. BANGLADESH
8. BARBADOS
9. BELGIUM
10. BENIN
11. BHUTAN
12. BOLIVIA
13. BRAZIL
14. BULGARIA
15. BURUNDI
16. CAMBODIA
17. CAMEROON
18. CANADA
19. CHILE
20. CHINA
21. COLOMBIA
22. COOK ISLANDS
23. COSTA RICA
24. CROATIA
25. CUBA
26. CYPRUS
27. CZECH REPUBLIC

SIGNATURE
16/03/98
16/03/98
29/04/98
29/04/98
---

-----29/04/98
--09/07/98
29/04/98
18/09/98
---

--29/04/98
17/06/98
29/05/98
-16/09/98
27/04/98
11/03/99
15/03/99
-23/11/98

28. DENMARK
29/04/98
29. DJIBOUTI
30. DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
31. ECUADOR
15/01/99
32. EGYPT
15/03/99
33. EL SALVADOR
08/06/98
34. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
-35. ESTONIA
03/12/98
36. EUROPEAN
29/04/98
COMMUNITY
37. FIJI
17/09/98
38. FINLAND
29/04/98
39. FRANCE
29/04/98
40. GAMBIA
-41. GEORGIA
-42. GERMANY
29/04/98
43. GREECE
29/04/98
44. GRENADA
45. GUATEMALA
10/07/98
46. GUINEA
--_
*With a territorial exclusion to the Faroe Islands

_

RATIFICATION
OR ACCESSION
03/11/98 (R)
28/09/01 (R)
31/05/02 (R)
28/09/00 (Ac)
09/04/99 (Ac)
22/10/01 (Ac)
07/08/00 (Ac)
31/05/02 (R)
25/02/02 (Ac)
26/08/02 (Ac)
30/11/99 (R)
23/08/02 (R)
15/08/02 (R)
18/10/01 (Ac)
22/08/02 (Ac)
28/08/02 (Ac)
17/12/02 (R)
26/08/02 (R)
30/08/02 (Ac)
30/11/01 (Ac)
27/08/01 (R)

REMARKS

% OF
EMISSIONS

0.4%

0.8%

0.6%

3.3%
(9)
(4)

09/08/02 (R)
30/04/02 (R)
16/07/99 (Ac)
15/11/01 (Ap)

1.2%

31/05/02 (R)*
12/03/02 (Ac)
12/02/02 (Ac)

0.4%

13/01/00 (R)
30/11/98 (R)
16/08/00 (Ac)
14/10/02 (R)
1/05/02 (Ap)
17/09/98(R)
31/05/02 (R)
31/05/02 (Ap)
01/06/01 (Ac)
16/06/99 (Ac)
31/05/02 (R)
31/05/02 (R)
06/08/02 (Ac)
05/10/99 (R)
07/09/00 (Ac)

0.3%
(1) (7)

(2) (8)

0.4%
2.7%

7.4%
0.6%

Winter 2003]

EVOLUTION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

47. HONDURAS
48. HUNGARY
49. ICELAND
50. INDIA
51. INDONESIA
52. IRELAND
53. ISRAEL
54. ITALY
55. JAMAICA
56. JAPAN
57. KAZAKHSTAN
58. KIRIBATI
59. LATVIA
60. LESOTHO
61. LIBERIA
62. LIECHTENSTEIN
63. LITHUANIA
64. LUXEMBOURG
65. MALAWI
66. MALAYSIA
67. MALDIVES
68. MALI
69. MALTA
70. MARSHALL ISLANDS
71. MAURITIUS
72. MEXICO
73. MICRONESIA
(FEDERATED
STATES OF)
74. MONACO
75. MONGOLIA
76. MOROCCO
77. NAURU
78. NETHERLANDS
79. NEW ZEALAND
80. NICARAGUA
81. NIGER
82. NIUE
83. NORWAY
84. PALAU
85. PANAMA
86. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
87. PARAGUAY
88. PERU
89. PHILIPPINES
90. POLAND
91. PORTUGAL
92. REPUBLIC OF KOREA
93. ROMANIA
94. RUSSIAN FEDERATION
95. SAINT LUCIA
96. SAINT VINCENT
AND THE GRENADINES
97. SAMOA
98. SENEGAL

99. SEYCHELLES
100. SLOVAKIA
101. SLOVENIA
**For the Kingdom in Europe

25/02/99
--13/07/98
29/04/98
16/12/98
29/04/98
-28/04/98
12/03/99
-14/12/98
-29/06/98
21/09/98
29/04/98
-12/03/99
16/03/98
27/01/99
17/04/98
17/03/98
-09/06/98
17/03/98
29/04/98
--29/04/98
22/05/98
07/07/98
23/10/98
08/12/98
29/04/98
-08/06/98
02/03/99
25/08/98
13/11/98
15/04/98
15/07/98
29/04/98
25/09/98
05/01/99
11/03/99

19/07/00 (R)
21/08/02 (Ac)
23/05/02 (Ac)
26/08/02 (Ac)
31/05/02 (R)

0.5%
0.0%

(3)

31/05/02 (R)
28/06/99 (Ac)
04/06/02 (At)
07/09/00 (Ac)
05/07/02 (R)
06/09/00 (Ac)
05/11/02 (Ac)

0.2%
3.1%
8.5%

(6)
0.2%

31/05/02 (R)
26/10/01 (Ac)
04/09/02 (R)
30/12/98 (R)
28/03/02 (R)
11/11/01 (R)

0.1%

09/05/01 (Ac)
07/09/00 (R)
21/06/99 (R)

15/12/99 (Ac)
25/01/02 (Ac)
16/08/01 (R)
31/05/02 (Ac)**

1.2%

18/11/99 (R)
06/05/99 (R)
30/05/02 (R)
10/12/99 (Ac)
05/03/99 (R)
28/03/02 (R)
27/08/99 (R)
12/09/02(R)
13/12/02 (R)
31/05/02 (Ap)
08/11/02 (R)
19/03/01 (R)

(5)
0.3%

3.0%
0.3%
1.2%

16/03/98
19/03/98
16/03/98
20/03/98
26/02/99
21/10/98

27/11/00 (R)
20/07/01 (Ac)
22/07/02 (R)
31/05/02 (R)
02/08/02 (R)

0.4%
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102. SOLOMON ISLANDS
103. SOUTH AFRICA
104. SPAIN
105. SRI LANKA
106. SWEDEN
107. SWITZERLAND
108. THAILAND
109. TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
110. TURKMENISTAN
111. TUVALU
112. UGANDA
113. UKRAINE
114. UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN &
NORTHERN IRELAND
115. UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA

29/09/98

116. UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
117. URUGUAY
118. UZBEKISTAN
119. VANUATU
120. VIET NAM
121. ZAMBIA

12/11/98

TOTAL

-

29/04/98
29/04/98
16/03/98
02/02/99
07/01/99
28/09/98
16/11/98
-15/03/99

31/07/02 (Ac)
31/05/02 (R)
03/09/02 (Ac)
31/05/02 (R)

1.9%
0.4%

28/08/02 (R)
28/01/99 (R)
11/01/99 (R)
16/11/98 (R)
25/03/02 (Ac)

29/04/98

31/05/02 (R)

--

26/08/02 (Ac)

29/07/98
20/11/98
-03/12/98
05/08/98

05/02/01 (R)
12/10/99 (R)
17/07/01 (Ac)
25/09/02 (R)

84

100

4.3%

-

43.7%

